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Aquinas' Principle of Individuation 





Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Thirteenth Century Catholic theologian 
and philosopher was one of the first Medieval philosophers to attempt to 
reconcile the newly re-introduced Aristotelian system with the Catholic 
religious thought ofthe day. Aquinas' numerous commentaries on Aristotle 
and his adoption of the Aristotelian thought form the basis for the whole of 
Aquinian metaphysics (as well as the basic Aristotileanism which pervades 
Aquinas' whole systematic philosophy), In this paper I will deal with a 
specific yet fundamental principle ofAquinianmetaphysics-the principle 
of individuation. On first reading of the Aquinian texts, the principle of 
individuation appears to be stated succinctly, yet further investigation into 
the concept of individuation reveals problems and ambiguities. As it is 
necessary for an understanding of the problem of individuation in the 
Aquinian system, I will start off with the basic ontology ofAquinas and then 
will proceed with one interpretation of the ambiguities which exist in the 
texts regarding the principle of individuation. I will then give a counter 
interpretation that Aquinas might level against my interpretation and the 
problems ofmy interpretation; finally, I will analyze any problems that arise 
from the Aquinian response. 
1. Primary Substance in Aristotle and Aquinas 
The difficulty in dealing with systematic philosophy is that it is 
difficult to know where to begin, since each concept is built upon previous 
concepts and all of the concepts are fundamentally interrelated. Neverthe­
less, I shall start by explicating Aquinas' fundamental ontology. Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, points out that the world is made up of individual 
things-or what Aquinas calls "primary substances", Socrates, Rover, and 
the pine tree in my yard are all existing individual primary substances in the 
world. I can ascribe certain qualities to these individual substances-I can, 
for instance, say that Socrates is a philosopher, that Rover is fIisky, and that 
the pine tree has snow on it. These are characteristics which apply 
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specifically to these individuals. Although these primary substances are 
complete individuals in themselves, they are not unique in themselves. for 
they also possess characteristic essential properties which can be categori­
cally ascribed to groups ofprimary substances. I can for example, say that 
Socrates is a man, as is Plato, or that Rover and Spot are both dogs. There 
is not just one pine tree in the world, but there are numerous trees-there are 
whole forests of individual pine trees. 11Us introduces the question of 
individuation: how can something be an individual thing yet also belong to 
a certain category or class of things? How can Socrates be Socrates the 
individual yet also belong to a more universal category of "Man"? The 
problem ofindividuation will become clearer when the ontological structure 
of the primary substance is explicated. 
Aristotle and Aquinas' ontology try to explain how it is that there 
exist individual primary substances which exist both as individuals and as 
members ofa larger non-individual or universal group. Their explanations 
or responses to this question characterize the basic ontological composition 
of the primary substance itself. What must be remembered when consider­
ing the ontology of Aquinas is that he continually stresses the unity of the 
primary substance. Individual things exist in the world, and the ontology 
which Aquinas proposes is ,ffi intellectual construct which explains the 
composing factors of the primary substance. Aquinas wlites that "[the 
intellect] is capable by nature of separating things which are united in 
reality" (Commentary on the Metaphysics, 491). 
Primary substances, for Aquinas, can be intellectually grasped as 
consisting of three major components-substantial form, prime matter, 
accidental forms, which combined, have existence (sec figure 1). 111e 
substantial form of a primary substance is that which gives the primary 
substance its underlying stl1lcture. The form is the universal component of 
the primary substance and makes the primary substance what it is, as well 
as giving it its commonality with other things of its type. The substantial 
form of Socrates and the substantial fonn ofPlato are identical-both have 
the same substantial form "Man". Rover and Spot have the identical form 
of"Dog" which they share with each other and with all other dogs. The Conn 
ofthe primary substance ofa tree is obviously different from both "Dog" and 
"Man" and can be described as the form of "Tree". The substantial form is 
the generalized principle which makes a thing what it is and subsumes it 
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under a universal category. The fonn, however, as will be seen, is not the 
complete essence of a primary substance. 
The second component of the primary substance is that of which a 
thing is made-this is prime matter (materia prima). The primary 
substance is not just pure structure; it is a structure of something. Prime 
matter, then, is the element of a primary substance which becomes struc­
tured by a substantial fonn. An analogy which helps to explain the basic 
relation of matter and fonn in a primary substance is the analogy of the 
sculptor and modeling clay. The sculptor cannot sculpt anything without 
clay, just as the fonn needs to be the structure of some "stuff'. This analogy 
breaks down, however, in that the clay itself already has some type of 
structure even before the sculptor is able to sculpt it. Prime matter, in the 
Aquinian system is completely formless and is, in itself, non-existent. This 
wi1l be explained later on, as will Aquinas' position that matter is the 
principle of individuation. 
Matter and fonn hold a special relationship in the Aquinian system 
in that they are the essential components of a primary substance. Aquinas 
believes that we can abstract from the primary substance the concepts of 
matter and fonn and come up with an intellectual construct of the essence 
ofwhat the primary substance is. Aquinas also calls this essence a secondary 
substance (see figure 2). The secondary substance, or essence of a thing, is 
not simply the substantial fonn, for as I explained, structure without 
something to structure is meaningless. A sculptor without clay (or iron or 
stone, etc.) is not a sculptor. The fonn indeed is that which gives structure 
and makes a thing belong to a certain universal category, but the essence of 
the primary substance, for Aquinas, involves a material component. This 
also will become clearer when I discuss the different ways in which matter 
can be considered. 
That matter and fonn do not constitute the entirety of a primary 
substance is evident in that we ascribe characteristics to individual primary 
substances which are part.icular to the individual but not necessarily compo­
nents of every member of the universal category to which the individual 
belongs. These characteristics introduce the third component of a primary 
substance-accidental fonns. When, for example, I said that Socrates is a 
philosopher, that Rover is frisky, or that the pine tree has snow on it, I am 
saying nothing that applies universally or essentially to the class to which 
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these individuals belong. The sentences. "Socrates is a Man" and "Socrates 
is a philosopher", do not predicate ofSocrates in the same way. In the first 
case, the predicate is an essential or substantial characteristic which tells us 
the essential nature of what Socrates is. Socrates could remain Socrates if 
he stopped philosophizing, but he would not remain Socrates if he ceased 
being a man. Put simply, accidental forms are exactly these characteristics 
which tell us not what a thing is, but tell us specific characteristics of an 
individual. Aquinas writes. "substantial form differs from the accidental 
form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply but 
to be such" (Summa Theologicae la. Q76 art. 4). Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, says that there are nine accidental forms which compose the 
primary substance; these are: quantity, quality, relation, place, time. 
position, habit, action and passion. As will be seen, only quantity plays a 
central role in the principle of individuation and for this reason it is 
unnecessary to consider the other eight accidental forms. 
Lastly, the primary substance has existence. Whereas the substan­
tial form tells us what a thing is, the existence component tell us that a thing 
is. Existence is not a descriptive quality orproperty ofa primary substance, 
but Aquinas wants us to realize that he is discussing things which do exist 
in reality. The distinction between essence and existence is treated at length 
by Aquinas (as in On Being and Essence) but is not ofcrucial importance to 
this analysis. 
II. Matter and Individuation 
Having considered the ontology of the individual primary sub­
stance, my attention will now shift to the principle ofindividuation. As I said 
before, individual primary substances exist in the world; it only remains to 
be discovered what makes the primary substances to be so individuated. In 
the Aquinian system, the substantial form is a universal property which 
applies categorically to different primary substances. Things of a class have 
identical universal forms. The question then arises as to how the universal 
substantial form becomes instantiated in primary substances yet remains 
universal. How can Socrates and Plato have the same universal form, 
"Man". without being the same man? What principle. then, makes all things 
that have identical substantial forms individuals? This is the problem of the 
principle of individuation. 
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Aquinas' answer, put simply, is that "matter is the principle of 
individuation" (On Bein~ and Essence. 74). Aquinas believes that matter is 
the component of a primary substance which individualizes the universal 
substantial fonn. Aquinas does. however, believe that the "principle of 
individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatever, but only 
designated matter" COn Being and Essence, 75). It is obvious from this 
passage that Aquinas views the concept of matter in several distinct ways. 
In fact. although he writes that we can identify "two kinds of matter" 
(Summa TheolQgicae 1 a. Q85, art 1). we can in fact distinguish three ways 
in which Aquinas writes of matter-prime matter (materia prima), 
nondesignated matter (materia communis) and designated matter (materia 
signata). To understand exactly what Aquinas means by designated matter 
and how it acts as a principle of individuation, it is necessary also to 
understand what Aquinas means when he talks of matter in other ways. 
In his commentary on Aquinas' On Being and Essence, Joseph 
Babik gives an excellent overview ofthe three ways in which matter can be 
viewed in the Aquinian system: 
The difference among the three is a difference of 
greater and lesser universality, or, to put this in another 
way, a difference oflesser and greater detail in intellectual 
grasp and expression. Thus. to speak of prime matter, or 
perhaps better of matter as prime, is to speak of what the 
matters of all individual composed substances have in 
common. To speak ofnon-designated matter, or of matter 
as non designated, is to speak of what the matters of all 
individuals of a same species have in common. Lastly, to 
speak of designated matter, or ofmatter as designated, is 
to speak ofwhat is proper to and distinctive ofthe matter of 
some determinate, individual, composed substance. 
Whether we speak of prime matter or of nondesignated 
matter, or of designated matter, we are talking about the 
same thing ..."(On Being and Essence, 78). 
Prime matter. ormatter viewed as prime, as was stated before, is one 
ofthe components ofthe composed primary substance. Aquinas writes that 
prime matter "lacks all forms which give it defIniteness" and since it "does 
not exist alone in reality be itself' (Gilby, 135), it is merely an intellectual 
59 AQUINAS' PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION 
construct. Prime matter is a purely intellectual concept which does not and 
cannot, as being fonn-Iess, exist except in a primary substance as an 
intellectually constructed component. Aquinas speaks of prime matter in 
itself as non-existent and property-less to again stress the unicity of the 
primary substance. Just as the fonn needs something to structure, prime 
matter is inherently dependent on some fonnal aspect for existence. The 
primary substance is a complete whole and its ontological parts exist 
separately only as intellectual constructs. Aquinas writes that only "through 
the fonn, which is the actuality ofmatter, [does] matter become something 
actual" (On Being and Essence, 70). 
Another way oflooking at matter for Aquinas is matter considered 
as common or nondesignated. Matter in this sense, like prime matter, is an 
intellectual construct, but whereas prime matter is matter considered as 
devoid of any fonn whatsoever, nondesignated matter is matter conceived 
as being structured by some fonn. Matter as nondesignated is the abstract 
material component which belongs to the secondary substance or the 
essence of a primary substance. Our concept of a secondary substance or 
essence is derived from the intellectual process of considering a variety of 
primary substances all of the same type. The concept of nondesignated 
matter arises out of a realization that prime matter and substantial form are 
always united to fonn the basis of a primary substance. To use Aquinas' 
example "it is nondesignated matter which is placed in the definition of 
man" ( On Being and Essence, 75). Individual men such as Socrates and 
Plato exist as individual primary substances and as such constitute a 
composite of prime matter, substantial fonn, and accidental fonns. The 
essence of both Socrates and Plato makes them men; they share the same 
common fonn ofHMan". The essence ofwhat a "Man" is, however, includes 
general, material characteristics-we know that men are not just fonns, but 
have actual bodies. Nondesignated matter is !he intellectual construct 
expressing the realization !hat men are not just formal entities but are 
necessarily composed of some specific matter. Aquinas makes this point 
when he writes that "This bone and this flesh are not placed in the definition 
ofman, but bone and flesh absolutely. These latter are man's nondesignated 
matter" (On Being and Essence. 75). Nondesignated matter, then, is an 
abstract intellectual realization that the definition ofwhat material!hings are 
necessarily entails a material component. 
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The third way in which Aquinas speaks of matter is as designated 
matter. Whereas nondesignated matter is inherent in a general way in the 
essence of a subject, and prime matter is also a mental construct which does 
not exist in itself, designated matter is the matter that is existent in the world 
and is readily apparent to us. Aquinas writes that "the essence ofman and 
the essence of [the individual] Socrates do not differ except as the 
nondesignated from the designated" (On Being and Essence, 81). The 
definition or essence ofallmen refers to matter viewed as nondesignated, or 
to a material component of which individual men are individual instances. 
Designated matter, though. is the specific matter ofthe individual. Follow­
ing Aquinas' example, the designated matter I have means that I am 
composed ofthis bone and this flesh, not as bone and flesh considered as a 
generalized concept which all men, as men, must have. 
III. Designated Matter and Individuation 
Since the "principle of individuation is not matter taken in any way 
whatever, but only as designated matter" (On Being and Essence. 75), this 
paper's focus on the principle of individuation requires a more in-depth 
analysis of the nature of designated matter. Aquinas defines designated 
matter when he writes. "I call that matter designated which is considered 
under determined dimensions" (On Being and Essence, 75). Now dimen­
sion, for Aquinas, arises from (or can be considered as) one of the nine 
accidents-specifically the ilrst accidental form, quantity. Aquinas often 
refers to quantity using two different terms-numerical quantity, which 
seems to be a common usage indicating "how much" of something there is. 
Secondly, Aquinas writes of quantity as "dimensive quantity" (Summa 
Theologicae 3a, Q77, 2). It is this latter type ofquantity which interests us 
in this discussion of individuation. For, as Aquinas writes, "[b]ecause the 
category of dimensive quantity alone carries this separation of specifically 
similar units, dimension would appear to lie at the root of individual 
multiplication" (Gilby, 160). Thus designated matter can be defined further 
to be matter considered as being under determined dimension, where 
dimension is itselfof the accidental form ofquantity. Further support for this 
comes from Efrem Bettoni when he writes, "The Thomistic solution, which 
places the principle of individuation in materia signata quantitate [matter 
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signified by quantity]. is well known" (Bettoni, 59). When Aquinas writes 
that designated matter is the principle of individuation, he means materia 
signata quantitate, or matter as signified by quantity. 
The problem of Aquinas' view of designated matter or materia 
signata quantitate as the principle of individuation arises out of the way in 
which the accidental forms (of which quantity is the first) inhere in the 
primary substance. In On Being and Essence and in his Commentary on The 
Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas seems to talk as if matter and form 
combined together compose, in themselves, a type of self-subsisting sub­
stance. Aquinas writes, "But that to which an accident comes is a being 
complete in itself and subsisting in its own existence" (On Being and 
Essenoo. 239), and Bobik comments that the accidents "depend on sub­
stances, as on a subject, for thei r beings" (On Being and Essence, 50). In the 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas criticizes the pre­
Socratics for believing that accidents reside in anything other than this 
"subsisting substance". this union ofprime matter and substantial form. He 
writes, "And they (the pre-Socratics] called those things forms which we call 
accidents, for example, quantities and qualities, whose proper subject is not 
firstmalterbut the composite substance" (Commentary on the Metaphysics, 
499). Quantity is an accidental form, which as an accident, must also depend 
on this "composite" ofprime matter and substantial form. The onl y way !hat 
an accidental form can have existence is through a substance which is 
composed of form and matter. 
On this account, then, the concept of designated matter already 
includes a material component and a formal component. Designated matter, 
as Aquinas says, is matter "considered under determined dimensions" (Qn 
Being and Essence, 75), or as was shown, as materia signata quantitate. 
But quantity, ordimensive quantity, is an accident, and as such, necessarily 
depends on this unified and subsisting composite subject for its being. 
Designated matter then, is an existing substance composed of substantial 
fonn, prime matter, and the accidental form ofquantity. Yetin the Aquinian 
ontology, this definition already specifies a primary substance. That is to 
say, if my account is correct, and form and matter together with the accident 
of quantity constitute the definition of designated matter, then designated 
matter cannot be a principle of individuation for a primary substance 
because it just is a primary substance. A primary substance, remember, is 
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something composed of substantial form, prime matter, accidental forms 
and which is existent. But is not this precisely the definition of designated 
matter? 
The problem. then, is how designated matter, which can already be 
considered a primary substance be the principle ofindividuation ofprimary 
substances. The fonn is the universal component of a primary substance­
both Plato and Socrates, as men, have identical fonns but are also individu­
als. Designated matter, considered on my account (see figure 3), cannot be 
the principle ofindividuation because designated matter contains in its very 
definition a formal aspect and can already be considered as being a primary 
substance. If we view designated matter as having the components of a 
primary substance-substantial form, prime matter and an accident (quan­
tity), then Aquinas is begging the question of individuation. Designated 
matter cannot be the principle of individuation of the primary substance 
because substantial form, prime matter and accidental forms are contained 
already in the definition of designated matter. 
My argument as given can be most concisely summed up in nine 
points: 
1. 	 Primary substances are individuals, but also 
belong to universalized groups. 
2. 	 Primary substances have the components of 
subsLantial form, prime maLter, accidental form, 
and are existent. 
3. Substantial form subsumes the primary substance 
under a universal category. 
4. 	 Designated matter is the principle that individu­
ates the primary substance. 
5. Designated matLeris matter signified by dimensive 
quantity. 
6. Dimensive quantity is an accidental form. 
7. "But that to which an accident comes is a being 
complete in itself and subsisting in its own 
ex.istence"(On Being and Essence, 239}-orthe 
union between prime matter and substantial form 
is the subject in which the accidents inhere. 
8. 	 Designated matter or materia signata quanti­
tate, is already an existing composite substance 
composed ofsubstantial form, prime matter and 
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the accident of quantity. 
9. 	 This, however can be considered a primary 
substance and designated matter, having sub­
stantial fonn, prime matter and the accidental 
fonn of quantity in its definition begs the ques­
tion of individuation of the primary substance. 
IV. Aquinian Response 
Because of the ambiguities that exist in many of the passages that 
deal with quantity, designated matter, and the principle of individuation, it 
is certainly possible that my interpretation is incorrect. How, then, might 
Aquinas respond to my argument and which specific point[s] might he 
attack? I will lay out a possible Aquinian response to my interpretation and 
then note any problems that arise from this Aquinian response. 
Aquinas would most likely attack my argument at my eighth point; 
he would probably fmd fault with my definition of designated matter as 
necessarily entailing some type of formal aspect. Insome passages, as I have 
shown, Aquinas seems to imply that matter designated by dimensive 
quantity necessarily entails some type of substantial form. Dimcnsive 
quantity, as an accidental form, could only be considered in relation to the 
composite ofmatter and form. In other passages, however, Aquinas seems 
to imply that quantity has as its subject not the union ofsubstantial form and 
prime matter, but rather prime matter itself. Aquinas writes that "since the 
parts ofa substance are matter and form, certain accidents follow principally 
on form, certain others follow principally on matter" COn Being and 
Essence, 240). Earlier in my analysis, I claimed that Aquinas proposed the 
inherence of accidents in a wholly composed substance; the passage just 
quoted suggests more ofa distinction between particular accidents as having 
their subject in either one part of the composite substance or the other. In 
the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas makes this 
distinction clear when he writes that some accidents can be considered as 
"something flowing from itt:; matter, and th.en it is quantity; oras something 
flowing from its form, and thenitis quality" (Commentary on the Metaphys­
~,346). I have not been able to find a text which gives a complete list of 
the exactsubject of the other seven accidents-which accidents "flow" from 
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matter and which from fonn, but from this passage it seems clear that 
quantity is to have as its subject not the union of both matter and fonn, but 
matter only. 
Aquinas writes in The Summa Theologicae that "dimensive quan­
tity is the very first accident which affects a material thing" (Summa 
Theologica~ 3a, Q77, art 2) and then makes the even stronger claim that 
"quantity has its basis in matter, parts of a quantity are part of a thing's 
matter" (Summa Theologicae 3a, Q90, art 2), ThatAquinas is drawing a fine 
line between the subject of the nine accidents is obvious; accidents do not 
have the composite as their su bject. but have one component or the other as 
their subjects. Aquinas, when he writes of accidents in this way, seems to 
undermine my proposition that designated matter necessarily has a formal 
component. By differentiating between accidents attaching to form and 
those properto matter, Aquinas drives a wedge between matter and fonn in 
my interpretation of designated matter. 
On this reading, Aquinas would perhaps defme designated matter, 
or matter characterized by quantity, as prime matter with the accident of 
quantity attached to it, this being made possible only by the union ofprime 
matter with substantial form. Put another way, the union ofform and prime 
matter is the necessary condition for quantity to be ascribed to matter, but 
the form is not included in the definition of materia signata quantitate. 
Only in the union of form and matter can matter be said to be quantified, but 
quantity is not given attached to the form nor is form contained in the 
definition ofdesignated matter. Any accidental form arises out ofthe union 
ofprimematter and substantial form-for accidents "dependon substances. 
as on a subject, for their being" (On Being and Essence, 50)-but it is not 
the case that the individual accidents inhere in the composite as a whole, but 
rather, to either prime matter or substantial form, not matter and form. 
Quantity is not given by the form nor does it inhere in the form, but rather, 
is made possible by the union of matter and form. 
Designated malter, then, is prime matter with an accident of 
quantity, made possible by the fact that matter and form are so united. 
Aquinas speaks this way when he writes that "from the fact that matter has 
corporeal existence through forms, it immediately follows that there are 
dimensions in matter" CPt< Anima, 115), and that "matter, so far as it is 
understood to have substantial existence as a perfection ... can, therefore, be 
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regarded as the subject of accidents" (De Anima, 115). Substantial form 
need only be included in the defInition of designated matter insofar as the 
union with matter is the necessary condition of matter to be quantified. 
Designated matter, in this Aquinian response, does not include a substantial 
form as a composing factor, but only as such that its (substantial fonn's) 
union with prime matter brings the possibility ofprime matter as quantified 
(See figure 4). 
In this possible Aquinian response to my position, designated 
matter as quantified matter can, it seems, be regarded as the principle of 
individuation. The definition of designated matter does not contain the 
fonn, and so this definition does not beg the question of individuation. So 
Aquinas can save the principle of individuation in this way, yet this new 
position has other serious consequences for Aquinas' system. On this 
account, quantity clearly plays the leading role in individuation. Matter with 
out quantity is not designated; matter as quantified, or under detennined 
dimensive quantity, is designated matter. Quantity then, is the prinCipal 
factor of individuation. Quantity, however, is an accident and this would 
seem to run counter to Aquinas' position that "It is obvious, then, that the 
principle of individuation is not a collection ofaccidents (as some said), but 
designated matter, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has stated" (Commentary 
on the Metaphysics. 602). Designated matter, as was shown, however, has, 
as its main component dimensive quantity, which is accidental. Designated 
matter, or materia signata quantitate, is accidental in nature. This, then, 
makes the principle of individuation contingent on an accidental fonn­
individuation is accidental. 
This characterization of designated matter as accidental and its 
inherent problem in the Aquinian system is the topic for a completely 
different paper; yet it still needs to be pointed out as a definite problem for 
Aquinas and was, in fact, a problem addressed by succeeding Medieval 
philosophers such as Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus saw a problem inherent in 
the Aquinian definition of designated matter as depending on an accidental 
fonn. Bettoni, in his book on Duns Scotus writes, "His [Scotus'] criticism 
is mainly based on the fact that quantity is an accident" (Bettoni, 60). Scotus, 
not contented with the accidental nature of designated matter in Aquinas' 
thought, responded by positing his famous prinCiple of individuation­
"Haecceity". Bettoni continues that in regards to the principle of individu­
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ation, "Duns Scotus has recourse to his theory of 'haecceity', or thisness" 
(Bettoni, 60). Briefly, Haecceity is a unique principle of the fonn which 
gives to each individual thing its individual perfection and is not dependent 
upon a material principle. 
So on my interpretation of the often ambiguous texts, designated 
matter begs the question ofindividuation and the principle of individuation 
remains as yet to be discovered. The Aquinian response reclaims for 
designated matter its status as the principle of individuation, but at the same 
time it raises a new problem-specifically the problem that Duns Scotus 
confronted-that the prinCiple of individuation in Aquinas is acciden­
tal. 
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Figure 1: Primary Substance 
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